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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order reversing a prior verdict 
finding Darren Justin Carmouche to be a persistent violator of the law. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Carmouche confronted his girlfriend Kirsteen Redmond with allegations 
that she had been having an affair. (Trial Tr., p. 70, L 21 - p. 74, L. 25.) She 
answered his questions, but "he didn't like what [she] was telling him." (Trial Tr., 
p. 75, Ls. 1-3.) He started punching her in the face in response to her answers to 
his questions. (Trial Tr., p. 75, Ls. 4-20.) After punching her in the face up to fifty 
times, he escalated the violence by slamming her head into a wall. (Trial Tr., p. 
76, L. 9 - p. 77, L. 19.) He then started hitting her body and legs with a baseball 
bat (Trial Tr., p. 77, L. 20 - p. 78, L. 13.) He repeatedly choked her and 
threatened to kill her and her children. (Trial Tr., p. 78, L. 16 - p. 79, L. 15; p. 81, 
Ls. 6-13.) 
The state charged Carmouche with attempted strangulation for choking 
Redmond, second-degree kidnapping for preventing her from leaving their home 
during the ongoing abuse, aggravated battery for hitting her with a baseball bat, 
and felony domestic violence for punching her and striking her head against the 
walls. (R., pp. 32-34, 57-59.) The state also charged sentencing enhancements 
for being a persistent violator and using a deadly weapon (the bat) in the 
commission of a felony. (R., pp. 40-44, 60-64.) At the conclusion of the trial the 
jury convicted Carmouche of the four charged felonies. (R., pp. 133-35; Trial Tr., 
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p. 410, L. 8 - p. 411, L. 15.) The pa1iies then stipulated to waive the jury in 
relation to the sentencing enhancements and continue the proceedings on those 
enhancements. (Trial Tr., p. 412, L. 4- p. 416, L. 12.) 
At the court trial on the enhancements the trial court concluded that 
evidence establishing two felony judgments with Carmouche's name, birth date 
and social security number "barely" met the state's burden of proving the 
persistent violator charge and "enter[ed] judgment accordingly." (11/12/10 Tr., p. 
58, L. 12- p. 60, L. 19; R. p. 140; State's Exhibits 62A, 64, 65.) 
About two months after the trial on the enhancements the district judge 
entered "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order." (R., pp. 156-62.) The 
judge stated he had "since reviewed the testimony and evidence presented" at 
the trial on the enhancements (R., p. 156), concluded that it was "required to 
make its findings as to the [enhancement] upon admissible evidence" (R., p. 
161 ), and determined that the testimony regarding Carmouche's social security 
number was hearsay (id.). Therefore, even though no objection to the testimony 
was asserted, the testimony should be disregarded. (Id.) "The Court thus finds 
and concludes that the State presented no admissible evidence as to the social 
security number of the defendant at trial in this case." (Id.) The district court 
then concluded that evidence establishing that both the defendant and the 
person on the judgments were Darren Dustin Carmouche born on
was, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence to support the verdict that 
Carmouche was a persistent violator. (R., p. 161.) The Court concluded that it 
had "erred in considering the hearsay testimony as to the social security number" 
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and thereby "erred in finding that the State had established the identity of the 
defendant as the person formerly convicted in the two Ada County Judgments." 
(R., p. 162.) 
The state moved for reconsideration of the court's order finding error in its 
previous verdict, asserting that, even assuming the court did not err otherwise, 
the only appropriate remedy was a new trial on the persistent violator 
enhancements. (R., pp. 169-72.) The court, however, thereafter entered a 
"Judgment of Acquittal Part II Persistent Violator Allegation." (R., pp. 180-81.) 




1. Did the district court err by, after entering a guilty verdict on the 
enhancement, sua sponte reviewing the hearing for unpreserved 
evidentiary error and concluding that testimony related to Carmouche's 
social security number should have been disregarded? 
2. Alternatively, even if the district court did not err by conducting its own sua 
sponte review of the record for evidentiary error in the trial of the 
enhancements and then ignoring competent evidence, did it err by 
granting an acquittal instead of granting a new trial based on the alleged 




The District Court Erred By Sua Sponte Reviewing The Trial For Unpreserved 
Evidentiarv Error And Refusing To Consider Competent Evidence In Support Of 
The Verdict 
A Introduction 
During the trial Detective Angela Weekes testified without objection that 
Carmouche's social security number was the same number as found on the 
applicable judgments of conviction. (Compare 11/12/10 Tr., p. 27, L. 17 - p. 31, 
L. 14, with State's Exhibits 64, 65.) The district court initially rendered a 
judgment finding that Carmouche was a persistent violator for having committed 
two prior felonies. (11/12/10 Tr., p. 58, L. 12 - p. 60, L. 19; R. p. 140; State's 
Exhibits 62A, 64, 65.) It later engaged in a sua sponte review of the record for 
unpreserved evidentiary error and deemed testimony admitted without objection 
to be hearsay and incompetent to support the verdict. (R., pp. 156, 161-62.) The 
district court committed reversible error in its reconsideration of its judgment of 
conviction for the persistent violator enhancement because it is well-established 
that hearsay evidence admitted without objection is competent evidence to 
support a verdict. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a verdict if 
there is substantial competent evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007); State v. Sheahan, 
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139 Idaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 
570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. The District Court Applied Incorrect Legal Standards When It Concluded 
That Hearsay Evidence Admitted Without Objection Was Not Competent 
Evidence To Support The Verdict 
The trial court reviewed its own verdict and determined that it was 
"required" to render its verdict "upon admissible evidence," and therefore, even in 
the absence of an objection to Detective Weekes' testimony the court would 
disregard it. (R., p. 161.) This is the opposite of the applicable law. "The 
general rule is that where hearsay evidence is admitted without objection, it may 
properly be considered in determining the facts .... " Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 
100, 105, 254 P.3d 1, 6 (2011) (citing Gem-Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Small, 90 
Idaho 354, 371, 411 P.2d 943, 953 (1966)). In addition, "hearsay evidence 
admitted without objection is as strong as any other legally competent evidence." 
Erhart, 151 Idaho at 105, 254 P.3d at 6 (internal quotation omitted). Were this 
not so, reviewing courts would have the obligation to review the record for 
unpreserved claims of error; a duty no reviewing court has. See, ShQ..., State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010) (unpreserved claims of 
error "shall only be reviewed" if shown to be fundamental, constitutional error); 
Everhart v. Washington County Rd. & Bridge Dep't, 130 Idaho 273, 274, 939 
P.2d 849, 850 (1997) (Court will not review the record for error). 
Because the district court undertook an independent review of the record 
for unpreserved evidentiary errors, and then deemed hearsay evidence admitted 
without objection to be incompetent to support its verdict, it applied an erroneous 
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legal standard. The proper legal standard would have prevented any review for 
unpreserved evidentiary errors, and required the district court to treat any 
hearsay admitted without objection as competent evidence supporting its verdict. 
Because the district court's first verdict and judgment is, as a matter of law, 
supported by competent evidence, that verdict and judgment must be reinstated. 
11. 
Alternatively, Even If The District Court Did Not Err By Conducting Its Own Sua 
Sponte Review For Evidentiary Error And Excluding Competent Evidence, It 
Erred By Granting An Acquittal Instead Of A New Trial 
A. Even If The Challenged Evidence Was Improperly Admitted. At Most 
Carmouche Was Entitled To A New Trial 
Alternatively, even if the district court had not committed reversible error in 
its review of the guilty verdict, it did commit reversible error by granting an 
acquittal instead of a new trial. The proper remedy for the erroneous admission 
of hearsay1 in a trial is not an acquittal but a new trial. li State v. Watkins, 148 
Idaho 418, 224 P.3d 485 (2009) (case remanded for new trial following 
determination of erroneous admission of hearsay evidence); State v. Hansen, 
133 Idaho 323, 329, 986 P.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 1999) (remedy granted for 
erroneous and non-harm less admission of hearsay evidence was to "vacate the 
judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial"). 
In State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals found error in the admission of copies of a North Dakota 
1 The state asserts that the social security number obtained from !LETS (11/12/10 
Tr., p. 28, L. 23 - p. 33, L. 17) was properly admitted as coming from a 
trustworthy public record. I.RE. 803(8). 
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judgment of conviction to prove a DUI enhancement. !Q_,_ at 892-93, 231 P.3d at 
537-38 (the trial court "erred in admitting the copies pertaining to Moore's North 
Dakota conviction" because they were not properly authenticated). After finding 
reversible error, the court concluded it "must determine the remedy appropriate 
for such an error." !Q_,_ at 893, 231 P.3d at 538. The court stated the general law 
that double jeopardy does not prevent a re-trial where the defendant secures 
reversal "on grounds other than insufficiency of the evidence." !Q_,_ (emphasis 
original). The court noted that the Supreme Court of the United States had held 
that in reviewing for the sufficiency of the evidence all the evidence considered 
by the jury must be included regardless of its admissibility. !Q_,_ at 894, 231 P.3d 
at 539 (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988)). The Court adopted the 
same approach, reviewed all the evidence admitted and determined it sufficient, 
concluded that the error was therefore mere trial error, and remanded for a new 
trial. Moore, 148 Idaho at 894, 231 P .3d at 539. 
The same analysis applies here. Reviewing all the admitted evidence 
shows two prior judgments of conviction identifying Carmouche as the defendant 
by first, middle and last name; date of birth; and social security number. 
Carmouche is therefore not entitled to an acquittal under double jeopardy. The 
proper remedy for what was at most mere trial error is therefore a new trial. 
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B. Even Excluding The Alleged Hearsay The Evidence Was Sufficient 
The evidence in this case, even excluding the social security number 
evidence, was sufficient to uphold the verdict. The evidence established that 
Carmouche's full name was "Darren Dustin Carmouche" and that his date of birth 
was (State's Exhibit 62A.) The evidence also established that in 
2000 "Darren Dustin Carmouche" with a date of birth of  was convicted 
of two felonies for possession of a controlled substance and forgery of a financial 
transaction card (State's Exhibit 64) and in 2001 "Darren Dustin Carmouche" with 
a date of birth of as convicted of felony possession of a controlled 
substance (State's Exhibit 65). This overwhelming evidence proves the 
enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The district court apparently concluded that the fact that the crimes of 
conviction (domestic violence and battery) were not the same as the prior crimes 
(controlled substances and forgery) and that the prior convictions happened in a 
different county was sufficient, as a matter of law, to create reasonable doubt. 
(R., p. 161 (state had to prove "the same name, same date of birth, same 
offense, and same county of conviction").) This was legally erroneous. To 
establish the enhancement the state was required to prove only that Carmouche 
had been previously convicted of two felonies. l.C. § 19-2514. The statute 
clearly does not prevent a finding of the identity element of the crime unless the 
prior conviction is for the same type of crime in the same county. 
Nor is the fact that the prior convictions were for different types of crimes 
in a different county truly significant in this case. The prior crimes were for 
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possession of controlled substances and the present crimes of violence were 
committed after extensive use of and while under the influence of controlled 
substances. (Trial Tr., p. 73, Ls. 8-23.) The prior convictions were in Ada 
County, but Carmouche's address on his driver's license was in Meridian, 
establishing a clear connection with Ada County. (State's Exhibit 62A.) The 
different nature of the crimes and the different counties they were committed in 
simply did not show that a different person with exactly the same name and birth 
date had been convicted of the prior felonies. Because the evidence that 
Carmouche was a persistent violator was overwhelming, the trial court erred by 
reversing its prior guilty verdict and judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
judgment of acquittal, reinstate the verdict finding Carmouche is a persistent 
violator, and remand for a new sentencing. 
DATED this 26th day of June, 2012. 
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